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# THE SECULARIZATION OF THE RUSSIAN MIND IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY CASE STUDY - OLD-BELIEVER ENTREPRENEURS

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(Received 21 December 2016, revised 2 July 2017)

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## **Abstract**

The phenomenon of secularization of the Russian mind is one of the most poorly understood issues of Russia's spiritual history. Traditionally, the secularization of Russian culture refers to the 17<sup>th</sup> century; however, this process lasted for several centuries, and every period had its own distinctive character. In this paper, we propose to trace the expression of the secularization process using the example of the Russian Old Believers, which initially emerged as a counter-secularizing movement. The religious system of the Old Believers influenced the process of converting a rent-paying peasant into the so-called 'capitalist peasant', then the merchant, and then the manufacturer. The intercommunion of Russian Old Believer entrepreneurs with the different classes of Russian society of the 19<sup>th</sup> century allows them to be a representative group for studying the processes of secularization of mind. Currently, historians have begun to explore the deeper background of entrepreneurial behaviour in the ethical teaching of the Old Believers, but the process of secularization is understudied.

*Keywords:* secularization, Russia, Old Believers, businessman, spiritual crisis

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## **1. Introduction**

Over the centuries Russian society was distinguished by deep sincere religiosity, but it could not avoid the spiritual crisis which developed at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century as contemporaries witnessed it. A lot of Russian thinkers in exile after 1917 tried to grasp the main roots of the crisis, like G. Florovsky, who was convinced that "last century the entire history of the Russian intelligentsia passed in keeping with religious crisis" [G. Florovsky, *Ways of Russian Theology. Chapter VI: Philosophical awakening*, <https://www.mpda.ru/data/203/645/1234/Puti%20russkogo%20bogoslavia%20ch2.pdf>].

Analysis of the concept of the 'spiritual crisis' deals with some methodological difficulties. Speaking about the crisis, we assume some standard and in comparison with it we consider some phenomena to be abnormal. But the

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concept of 'spiritual crisis' is ambivalent. On one hand, we deal with the norm of the religious consciousness, belief system, axioms, ideas and values that are crucial for some denomination. On the other hand, this object is distinguished by subjectivity: the consequences of the economic crisis, for instance, are expressed in the obvious form, but religious crisis, affecting every person, always has unique manifestation and individual characteristics [1].

The problem of the spiritual crisis is the interdisciplinary sphere for many scholars: psychologists, theologians, sociologists. For historians, the analysis of specific indicators of this crisis on the basis of the representative historical sources in a certain period of time is of crucial importance.

The spiritual (religious) crisis can be defined as a state of the drastically changing perception of cultural constants related to the religious sphere. An individual cannot find a solution for the religious problems in the traditional system of spiritual and moral values, so a person has to create a new system of values or rethink one's meaning system.

According to researchers' standpoint, the crisis situation of the XIX century in Russia was the result of a complex interaction of two factors: on one hand, the general nature of Church-state relations in Russia, typical for the era of the Synod, on the other - the peculiarities of the process of secularization of Russian society in XIX century [1].

There are a lot of researches in the Russian historiography on the first aspect, but there are no historical studies on the process of the secularization of Russian mind, except for works published abroad by Russian expatriates [<https://www.mpda.ru/data/203/645/1234/Puti%20russkogo%20bogoslavia%20c h2.pdf>; 2]. Yuliya Sinelina has made a huge impact in studying historical aspects of this problem in terms of Sociology [3], but still there is no detailed historical work on this issue. The European and American historians examine mostly the process of forced secularization after 1917 [4].

This article attempts to answer the question what particular manifestations the spiritual crisis in Russia had and how the process of secularization affected the most conservative part of the Russian religious community - the Old Believers.

Our study focuses on the analysis of the least studied period of Russian secularization – the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Taking account of the class character of Russian society, this process has differences in each stratum. As a representative group, the Russian Old Believer entrepreneurs are taken in this work. Russian entrepreneurs always were distinguished by their social and economic mobility, and they were ground breakers by reason of visiting European and Eastern countries. The Old Believer entrepreneurship phenomenon is unique due to the combination of religious work ethic and the external factor of being a persecuted group in Russia which turned them into one of the most economically progressive social communities of their time. The ambivalence of Russian Old Believers, which combined open-mindedness and conservatism, led to the fact that "in spite of the attempt to preserve the old way of life, the schism was constantly changing under the auspices of the permanent" and eventually

pointed the way to a whole new world built on free labour and democratic convictions” [5]. The group emerged as a “countersecular project” [6] having reached financial independence and cancellation of the faith persecution, it underwent secularization processes from the inside.

Following Owen Chadwick’s advice: “we ought to be asking a different and more fundamental question: what changes in economic or social order lay under the willingness of a society to jettison notions which hitherto were conceived as necessary to its very existence” [7], we’ll try to identify the underlying causes and special features of the secularization process among the Russian Old Believers entrepreneurs through major changes in their lifestyle and behaviour. Secularization of the Russian mind is often studied on the basis of philosophical works and belles lettres. The nobility and the educated strata of society have traditionally been studied as a ‘mirror’ of secularization in Russia. This study’s emphasis is on research of secularization in daily life of a notable religious community of the middle class. Our main reason to focus on an analysis of this particular group of Russian society was to discover in what specific way it sheds new perspectives on the nature of this process. This aim has been accomplished by implementing Weber’s method of the ideal type and methods of Sociology of religion. Methodologically we found it useful to allocate a specific group of culture constants typical of the particular religious mind and describe the process of their transformation in the process of secularization.

## **2. Secularization of the Russian mind**

European and American researchers have a rich tradition of studying aspects of secularization of mind [7; 8; F.J. Lechner, *Secularization*, <http://sociology.emory.edu/home/documents/profiles-documents/Lechner-Secularization.pdf>], and for Russian historiography this issue mostly is terra incognita.

Secularization refers to the historical process in which religion loses social and cultural significance. Secularization captures a long-term societal change, but it has consequences for religion itself [<http://sociology.emory.edu/home/documents/profiles-documents/Lechner-Secularization.pdf>].

Secularization is not a one-dimensional process of ‘overcoming religion’. It is a complex, self-contradictory process which is ambiguous in its consequences. Weber pointed to the origins of secularization in Judeo-Christian tradition: the prophets of Israel rejected idolatry and paved the way for the desacralization of nature and history. In the era of the Reformation, Protestantism in the process of ‘disenchantment with the world’ reached its climax; in the doctrine of ‘lay vocation’ professional activity acquired a religious value. The secular and profane became dominant, but it did not displace the sacral completely.

The New Testament books clearly divided the sacral and secular and appealed to escape not only the dangers of devotion to mundane lifestyle and chores but they warned about departure from spirituality: “Love not the world, neither the things that are in the world. If any man loves the world, the love of the Father is not in him. For all that is in the world, the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, is not of the Father, but is of the world. And the world passeth away, and the lust thereof: but he that doeth the will of God abideth for ever.” (1 John 2.15-17)

Contemporary European researchers have also identified a tendency towards secularization among the Protestant entrepreneurs, whose faith peculiarities and religious fervor initially promoted the accumulation of capital: “Although we cannot notice the fact that, gradually, the moral-religious root of Protestantism began to fade, the excitement and tension of searching the Kingdom of heaven were attenuated, while capitalism has grown increasingly cultivating, even up to excess, the economic effects of the movement, translated by a very earthly utilitarianism. Professional ethics and the consciousness of the beginning were altered, turning into speculation and greed. The spiritual religious essence gradually disappeared to a great extent, remaining only the shell, a perverted social mechanics, from which many crises were born. For ‘man does not live by bread alone’.” [9]

Traditionally, the secularization of Russian culture refers mostly to the 17<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, however, this process lasted for several centuries in succession, and every period had its own distinctive character. The 17<sup>th</sup> century was the century of encounters and clashes with the West and the East. The schism did not appear by accident at that epoch. This period was marked by the growth of secular and democratic elements, the rise of the bourgeois and the capitalization of public relations. The incorporation of bourgeois values into social relations assumes, of course, the secularization of culture. The process of secularization in Russia is closely linked to the process of Europeanization. A merchant of the 17<sup>th</sup> century acted as a conductor of secular culture through trade contacts with the countries of Western Europe. The Western cultural influence was spreading in Russia along with imported goods through the active merchant elite’s maintenance of the close contacts with visiting Russian foreign merchants [10].

Georgiy Florovsky emphasized that the schism, ‘retreat into ritual’ was ‘a belated self-defence against the incipient collapse of custom and routine’ in the process of expansion of secularization. “That is why ritual, model, example, some sort of mooring and external standard, became so necessary.” [<https://www.mpda.ru/data/203/645/1234/Puti%20russkogo%20bogoslavia%20ch2.pdf>]

The French historian Pierre Pascal (*Avvakum et les débuts du Raskol. La crise religieuse au XVIIe siècle en Russie*) saw the emergence of schism in the conflict between two different conceptions of Christianity in Russian society of the 17<sup>th</sup> century. One wing included devotees and ascetics; the other - sensual and free-thinking people: the followers were “as indifferent to the benefits of

this world, as the others - to heavenly joys. In the 17<sup>th</sup> century the ordinary Muscovite ceases to care of their soul salvation and seeks entertainment only. The Old Believers feel that ... they protect the true faith from those who want to minimize it.” [11] In the opinion of the P. Pascal, Patriarch Nikon and his episcopate, “paved the way for a secular, political concerns, science and passion for the beautiful things’ instead of ‘taking care of piety, asceticism and charity” [11, p. 615].

One of the pillars of the historiography of the Old Believer movement considered the struggle between bogolyubtsy (adherents of the old faith) and Patriarch Nikon to be one of the main reasons for expansion of secularization in the 17<sup>th</sup> century. Both camps were supporters of the churchification of Russia, but their controversies “weakened the conservative Church wing of Russian society and diminished Church influence on the state” [12]. Being focused on a mutual self-destruction, “they opened the way for the rapid secularization of the country, especially of its governing class, the nobility, which had always sought to limit the influence of the ecclesiastical authorities in the country” [12, p. 200]. The Europeanization of the 17<sup>th</sup> century did not penetrate into Russian society as rapid as under Peter I, but success of Peter’s undertaking was possible due to great psychological and cultural changes under Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich. West got close to Moscow, and the old way of life began to wither away in the Moscow high society.

Julia Sinelina allocates three cycles of secularization in Russia: the first comprised the nobility and of the intelligentsia; second - the middle class (the commoners, the new intelligentsia); third - the workers and peasants. Since the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> century - the reforms of Peter I - Russia moved from a total medieval religion to secular society. Religious values were replaced with mundane ones; lifestyle and habitual behaviour were changing. The nobility was the first to step on the path of secularization. This stratum was not homogeneous, so its various groups were at different stages of secularization. Later new layers of Russian educated society, the emerging intelligentsia, followed the nobility in this process. It is noteworthy that the process of secularization in different social strata had common features - every social layer passed through the same ideas which, though changing the historical and philosophical context over time, did not change in fact [3].

The 19<sup>th</sup> century is a special period in the history of secularization in Russia: the secularization process captured the majority of the population of the Russian Empire, and it led to the spiritual crisis of the Russian society. It’s obvious that the general process of secularization in Europe had influence on Russian culture and contributed to the spread of materialistic doctrines, such as Marxism, which would bear fruit later - in Russian revolutions of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century.

### **3. Russian Old-Believer merchants as a representative sample of secularization process**

So why were Old-Believer entrepreneurs chosen as a representative group for our study? Adherents of this religious denomination turned out to create successful and strong dynasties of the Russian businessmen.

Following Max Weber's theory, Russian researchers see a direct link between the religious ethics of Old-Believers and initial capital accumulation process, as well as its impact on the fundamentals of management, business and charity [5, 13, 14]. Contemporary scientists convey the idea that the religious system of the Old-Believers contributed to the transformation process of turning a rent-paying peasant into, at first, a so-called 'capitalist peasant', then a merchant, and then a manufacturer. Though historians have recently begun to explore the deeper background of entrepreneurial behaviour in the ethical teaching of the Old-Believers, the processes of secularization of mind is practically understudied [6].

Obviously, genealogical aspect is crucial in the history of the entrepreneur's family, because the continuity of generation and capital is a qualitative indicator of business success. The object of our study is of dual nature that's why the stability of entrepreneurial dynasties of Old-Believers is considered in two ways. This phenomenon assumes propagation from generation to generation labour traditions, a family business, and foundations of their faith. On one hand, it is the entrepreneurial sustainability, as conservation and the successful development of family business; on the other hand, it is religious stability, as preservation of ancestral faith in the same family for generations.

In this paper, we follow the process of secularization of Old Believer entrepreneurs' dynasties, some of them took their origin from the second half of the XVIII century. The history of the origin and development of this can be divided into two cyclic periods: 1) the second half XVIII – 1861, 2) 1861-1917. The abolition of serfdom in 1861 contributed to the emergence of new entrepreneurial dynasties of former peasants. Both of these periods had similar processes departing from their ancestors' faith approximately in the third generation.

Geographically, we take the territory of the Central industrial region of the Russian Empire, namely the territory of Vladimir province, as one of the largest industrial and commercial centre.

Researchers of the history of the Moscow Old Believers' communities noticed that the crisis affected them in the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century: "It's important to mention that in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century the Old Believer communities of Moscow actually were undergoing a rapid disintegration, a process which had been in evidence for at least two decades" [15].

After analysis of a number of sources, we came to the conclusion that the main causes of secularization in the Old Believer communities were: governmental persecution, a secular education, Europeanization, financial well-

being and, as a consequence, obsession with material wealth, desire to improve social position and obtain political career.

Old Believers were oppressed denomination as the government through a system of religious persecution sought to return them to Nikonian church's fold. Governmental policy to the schism was of a cyclical nature: periods of relatively peaceful coexistence gave way to heavy persecution. Thus, in critical time entrepreneurs dynasties could change the faith and continue their economic activities successfully within a few generations. Nicholas' I policy had especially severe persecution toward the schism.

William L. Blackwell emphasizes that "the tsarist state of Nicholas I unwittingly accelerated the secularization of the schismatic middle class of Moscow through persecution. The reaction to this persecution was no longer resistance, suicide, and flight, as had been the case a century earlier, but rather compromise, disavowal, and indifference. In the 1850s, many leaders of the Theodosian community rejoined the Orthodox Church in the *Edinoverie* movement, a kind of halfway house for the Old Believers sponsored by the government to recapture dissenters for the official faith. Others had become secularized and Westernized businessmen for whom religious duties were of little concern and who abandoned the precarious status of Old Believer with ease..." [15, p. 420].

For running business without obstacles entrepreneurs (the second-generation of dynasties) left the schism for Edinoverie as a compromise measure, or 'Nikonian' Church. Edinoverie was a branch of the Old Believers' movement, whose adherents were under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate while preserving the ancient liturgical rituals (dvoeperstie, Church service with Old printed books, etc.) and Old Russian lifestyle pattern. 19 Old Believer families left the schism from 1831 to 1851 in Vladimir province [16]. However, after the cease of persecution only a few of them returned to the faith of their fathers.

The spread of secularization, caused by the improvement of the legal and social status of religiously persecuted minority was known since the first centuries of Christianity. Termination of persecution and the legalization of Christianity under Constantine the Great influenced the secularization of the Church, which appeared in the obsession with luxury among laymen, in contrast to the poverty and simplicity of the original Christianity [P. Schaff, *History of the Christian Church*, Chapter III: *Alliance of church and state and its influence on public morals and religion*, [http://www.bible.ca/history/philip-schaff/3\\_ch03.htm](http://www.bible.ca/history/philip-schaff/3_ch03.htm)].

Let's look at some examples where improvement of social status influenced the departure from the ancestors' faith. Akim Maltsev was the representative of the second generation of the dynasty of 'Russian crystal kings'. In the early 1760s he was charged with a secret commitment to Old Belief. According to a Gregory Nikitich Vorobiev's report who was a worker from his factory, the investigation was launched and lasted for three years. It turned out that Akim Maltsev adhered to the old faith, and forced the workers of his factory

to “pray for his, Maltsev, custom in his house” at the factory, where had been “arranged special chapel with proper furniture” [17]. Due to wealth and influence of Maltsev, the investigation had no consequences.

According to the decree of August 14, 1775 Akim Maltsev was ennobled for his services and received the highest rank of lieutenant-general according to the Table of Ranks. His children, on the basis of the nobility rights received by their father, in 1786, were recorded for military service in the Guards cavalry regiment and to their early 20s had the rank of sergeants. They were secular youths, who played cards, were addicted to horseracing and intermarried with prominent noble families [18].

Old Believers underwent the spiritual crisis of the late XIX – early XX centuries that manifested itself in the departure from religion which was witnessed by contemporaries.

A German economist and Moscow State University, Professor Gerhart von Schulze-Gävernitz, studied the Russian textile industry and land relations in 1891-1892. According to him, after the Ivanovo (one of the largest textile centres of Russia, part of Vladimir province) factory owners “finally had the permission to build their chapel in the 1820s... schism lost its acute nature and gradually disappeared, as the descendants of these manufacturers began to go to Moscow and even in England, and learned a high society; in this case, of course, they were deprived of the heritage of their fathers” [19].

Old Believers’ newspapers paid much attention to proper upbringing of the younger generation in connection with the spiritual impoverishment: “At the moment almost all the parents and teachers complain of religious indifference and moral turpitude of the younger generation. The liberation movement ... has been understood by many people as the complete destruction of all religious basis and moral principles.” [20]

One of the ‘pillars’ of the Old Believer entrepreneurship, the representative of the third generation of the famous entrepreneurial dynasty, Vladimir P. Ryabushinsky, also worried about the process of secularization in his co-religionist community. He saw the roots of this process for Russian entrepreneurial community in the break of the spiritual connection between the businessmen and their social background: “History of almost every big Moscow merchant family shows the picture of this decay” [21].

In his mind, every Old Russian merchant family was characterized by the peasant origin of the family and deep religiosity of their founders. “All our eminent merchants descended from peasants... who were distinguished by faith zeal; a lot of Old Believers were among them” [21]. A family business founder, a former serf, became a first-class merchant. Even descending from common people’s strata, he maintained the lifestyle he grew up in until his death. The factory owner associated himself with his factory workers both in routine and spiritual life. The son of the business founder resembled father in many ways, often being much talented and more intelligent; he led the business company to the Russian national level. The son’s everyday life became different: a luxury as was followed by broad charity [21, p. 154-156].



Contemporary historians support Ryabushinsky's thesis about the importance of spiritual connection between the owners of the factories and their workers: "Master and servant were bound not only through promissory notes but also by ties of belief and bonds forged by the state persecution they shared. They protected each other... Eventually, secularization would dissipate this bond of faith between workers and employers, just as it would erode the religious ethic of the businessman." [15, p. 416]

According to V.P. Ryabushinsky, death of the dynasty founder coincided with the expansion of the spirit of capitalism in Russia, which improved business discipline but destroyed the old connection with people. V.P. Ryabushinsky emphasized that capitalism which entered Russia in the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century had already been distorted by materialism: "asceticism was replaced by a thirst for pleasure; a sense of responsibility before God had been lost; but reverence for wealth was even increased" [21, p. 150-151].

The importance of large-scale industry and trade in Russia was increased and it brought entrepreneurs to the ruling class of nobles and officials. It ruined the unity in the economic community and gradually led to a complete separation of the upper and lower classes.

The grandson of the founder witnessed the beginning of the spiritual impoverishment of the 'entrepreneurial aristocracy'. Having received an excellent education, and visited the countries of the West Europe, the entrepreneur faced a moral dilemma: "The old ideal of 'pious rich man' seemed naïve to him; to be impious rich man, as taught by the West - his soul does not accept ... Sometimes the end of the penitent merchant was very sad." The great-grandson of the founder was a materialistic Western capitalist of the late XIX century. He was deprived of moralities and religious commitment of his ancestors, he saw his own company only as a mean of personal enrichment [21, p. 156].

The story of another Old Believer merchant family – the Guchkovs – verifies Ryabushinski's theory: 'four generations of Guchkovs illustrate three stages of social evolution: the original accumulation of capital by the religious leader of the dissenting group; the building of the industrial empire by his secularized, capitalist sons and grandsons; and, finally, a fourth generation making a decisive move from business to politics' [17, p. 421]. Moreover, not only the Guchkovs, but the Ryabushinskys, the Konovalovs – politicians who determined Russia's political development – were descendants from Old Believer entrepreneurial dynasties. Frequently Old Believer entrepreneurs held local administrative positions in Vladimir province in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

Many foreigners who visited Russia at the time, pointed out the secularization of the Old Believer merchants in their memories. A German agricultural scientist, economist and writer, best known for his account of conditions in Russia as revealed by his 1843 visit, Baron August von Haxthausen noticed that modern European cultivation and equalization accomplished "which the Church has as yet failed to effect": "The Starovertsi in

the large cities - Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Riga, - merchants and manufacturers who have grown rich, only remain true to their Sect for the first generation; the next cut off their beards, throw off the kaftan, and put on coats; and with the old customs and dress their religious opinions also disappear. It cannot however be asserted that they are then distinguished for morality and true cultivation.” [22]

Henri Jean Baptiste Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu was a French publicist and historian specialized in writing about the history of Russia. He came to Russia to collect documents on the political and economic organization of the Slavic nations, and on his return published a series of articles, which appeared shortly afterwards in book form under the title *L'Empire des tsars et les Russes* (Empire of the Tsars and the Russians, 1897–1898). He came to Russia half a century after August von Haxthausen’s visit but he also noticed the difference in religious zeal between ‘fathers and sons’. He was acquainted with some Old Believer entrepreneurs and described the process of secularization in that stratum: “Such are these wealthy Old-Believers at the present day, not unlike in this respect from many rich merchants of Moscow: they have all the superfluities of our civilization, while the essential, the substance, frequently escapes them... Perhaps the sons, who at each generation drop some of their fathers’ prejudices, will step out of raskol, being already taken out of the narrow circle of ideas in which they were born.” [23]

He considered the wealth and the changes in social position to be the main reasons for the apostasy: “To the great scandal of good provincial souls, young Old Believers are already seen in Moscow smoking, shaving, dancing, frequenting the theatres. Wealth, which has begun the Raskol’s social emancipation, will end by accomplishing its intellectual emancipation also, so that, after having been temporarily a source of strength, money and the conditions it creates will become a cause of weakness and undermine the Raskol’s doctrines and principles. Men cannot grow rich with impunity, and through wealth the Schism will have to mitigate its rigor or – to perish.” [23]

Secularization of mind appeared in ways of spending leisure time: rich Old Believers became avid theatregoers and art patrons as Savva Morozov. Morality of merchants has changed dramatically by the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century: they fell into disrepute by smoking, drinking alcohol and provocative behaviour (i.e. a merchant Ivan Karatygin from Murom was famous for pig riding round the city). Divorce and infidelity was no longer the exception.

#### 4. Conclusions

For a long period of the second half of XVIII century to 1917 dynasties of Old Believers entrepreneurs has passed a thorny way from the capitalist peasantry to the owners of the largest business companies of the Central industrial region. But their confessional stability is largely inferior to the entrepreneurial one. Their business companies experienced periods of economic downturns and even cases of bankruptcy, but due to their co-religionists’

support, dynastic marriages and hard work, they managed to restore their economic position after the recession. Low religious stability of dynasties reveals common trends in secularization of Russian society and spiritual crisis of the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, caused by the rationalization of consciousness, the spread of materialistic attitudes and improvement of the legal and material well-being.

In this study we have attempted to show the process of secularization in a particular layer of the Russian society of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, which played an important role in the development of the modernization of Russia. During the 19<sup>th</sup> century Old Believers were influenced by secularization of Russian society as a whole, commodification of spirituality, Westernization of culture and modernization of social institutions, the consequences of all these factors were the spiritual crisis. Improving of the social and material status of Old Believers as 'deviant religious group', who originally had to do a trade and industrial business for survival, led the process of secularization in their community. The period of extreme governmental persecution and their cessation after the death of Nicholas I, the financial success and opportunity to receive a secular (often European) education, entering into high society of Russia also contributed to this process. Historical sources given in this study show the process of secularization through generations, emphasizing the generation gap problem. Secularization was also displayed in the break with fathers' traditions and moral decline of some entrepreneurs: adultery, second marriage, acquired 'sinful' habits (smoking, drinking alcohol and gambling), as well as donated both secular art (which was totally unacceptable to their ancestors) and some charitable institutions. Of course, not all Old Believer entrepreneurs were under the influence of secularization, some of them remained committed to their faith until the revolution of 1917 and kept it despite all the persecution of the Soviet regime.

### **Acknowledgement**

This work has been supported by the grant No. 014/13 of Vladimir State University, named after Alexander G. and Nicholas G. Stoletovs.

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